Product · Evidence

Audit trail and certificate of completion

Every signing produces evidence to support your position if a signature is disputed: a tamper-evident event log, a sealed PDF and a bilingual certificate.

Hash-chained audit events
SHA-256
Hash-chained audit events
Seal embedded in the signed PDF
PAdES-B-T
Seal embedded in the signed PDF
Third-party timestamp
RFC 3161
Third-party timestamp
Bilingual certificate of completion
AR + EN
Bilingual certificate of completion
SahlSign hash-chained audit trail for a signed document
Illustrative view with sample data.
Audit trail

A record that shows if anyone changed it

Each event is hashed together with the one before it. Edit or delete any entry and every later hash stops matching.

The whole journey, timestamped

Sent, email link clicked, viewed, consent to sign electronically, code sent and verified, signed, declined, reassigned, completed — each with time, IP address and device.

Checked every night

An automatic sweep re-verifies every document’s chain overnight, so a break is caught by us, not discovered later by someone else.

Signer identity check

Before signing, each signer enters a one-time code sent to their email. The code is stored only as a keyed hash, and the verification is part of the record.

One-time code verification

Hand-overs stay visible

If a signer is reassigned or delegates, the record shows who held the request at each moment — earlier events are never re-labelled with the new signer.

Sealed documents

Proof that travels with the PDF

PAdES seal

The signed PDF carries an embedded PAdES-B-T signature (ETSI EN 319 142). Change a single byte after signing and Adobe Reader, or any PAdES-aware viewer, flags it.

Independent timestamp

An RFC 3161 timestamp from DigiCert, a third-party timestamping authority, fixes when the signature existed — not just when our servers say it did.

Certificate of completion

One page your legal team can file

Arabic and English, sealed

Sent with the signed document: signers, the event timeline, document hashes and timestamp status. The certificate is itself sealed, so it is as tamper-evident as the document it describes.

Reading the certificate

Anyone can check it

Scan the QR code on the certificate to confirm it online, or drop any signed PDF into the free verifier to inspect its signature and timestamp.

Plainly stated

What SahlSign does not offer yet

  • Our seal certificate is not yet on Adobe’s trusted list, so Adobe Reader confirms the document is unchanged but does not show a green “trusted signer” tick. An Adobe-trusted certificate is on order.
  • Qualified or national-ID signatures (Nafath, UAE Pass, Smart QID). SahlSign signatures are electronic signatures backed by this evidence, not qualified signatures.
  • Long-term validation data (PAdES-B-LT/LTA) embedded in the PDF.

Everything else on this page is live today.

Frequently asked questions

What happens if someone edits the signed PDF?

The seal no longer matches the bytes, and PDF readers that check signatures report the document as modified after signing.

Is the audit trail in the PDF?

The certificate of completion summarises it, including the event timeline and hashes. The full chained log stays in SahlSign and can be exported from the document’s audit page.

Can the other party verify without an account?

Yes. The QR code on the certificate and the free PDF verifier both work without signing in.

See the evidence for yourself

Start free, sign a test document, and open the certificate that comes back.

Start free